The media says that the 7/7 bombers went to extremist Islamist Madrassas in Pakistan. What they don’t say is that Madrassas are run by Pakistan intelligence and they were given support by the CIA.
The Independent article suggests that Tanweer met the killer of reporter Daniel Pearl, Saeed Sheikh. Yet, Sheikh works for Pakistan intelligence.
The argument that UK Muslim anger at Western policy in the Middle East led to 7/7 does not add up. One could argue that many are angry but only a few would vent that anger through extremist ideology and murder. But what we’re supposed to believe is that:
- many UK Muslims were angry but were not duped by extremist ideology;
- this anger did not lead to many small acts of violent disorder or criminality;
- it did lead to four people who were trained and duped by extremist ideology and became expert in undercover activities and perfectly executed their first terror operation and killed themselves and others whilst doing so;
- there has been no further criminal terrorism or small acts of violent disorder by these angry Muslims or duped extremists;
- and despite the international scope of the terror threat, there has been no large attacks on any UK facilities abroad (excluding Iraq).
So, there are Muslims inside and outside the UK who are mad enough to kill themselves and British people but they are only mad enough to do it once.
http://www.globalterrorism101.com/South ... eview.html
World Conflict Quarterly
News, Analysis and Articles on Terrorists & Terrorism
Islamist extremism has been used by Pakistan, as an instrument of state policy, since the 1980s, to further the country's foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India, and its quest for 'strategic depth'. The Pakistani state and the Taliban have been co-sponsors of a terrorist network that essentially relies on madrassas (seminaries) and terrorist training camps located in Pakistan and (previously) in Afghanistan. There are an estimated over one million students studying in more than 10, 000 madrassas (some private estimates place their number between 40,000 and 50,000), with militant Islam as their core syllabus.
There is, at present, little evidence to suggest that Pakistan has abandoned, or even diluted, its strategy of using Islamist extremism as an instrument of state policy. The Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir remains the prime target of this strategy, and of the activities of Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups.
Cooperative Research has created a 911 timeline using published, mainly media, sources
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/time ... d_9/11=isi
March 1985: US Escalates War in Afghanistan
Osama bin Laden in 1989.
Tens of thousands more will study in the hundreds of new madrassas funded by the ISI and CIA in Pakistan. Their main logistical base is in the Pakistani city of Peshawar. [The Hindu, 9/27/01; Washington Post, 7/19/92; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/23/01; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 9/23/01] In the late 1980s, Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto, feeling the mujahedeen network has grown too strong, tells President MFEMFE H. W. Bush, “You are creating a Frankenstein.” However, the warning goes unheeded. [Newsweek, 9/24/01] By 1993, President Bhutto tells Egyptian President Hasni Mubarak that Peshawar is under de facto control of the mujahedeen, and unsuccessfully asks for military help in reasserting Pakistani control over the city. Thousands of mujahedeen fighters return to their home countries after the war is over and engage in multiple acts of violence. One Western diplomat notes these thousands would never have been trained or united without US help, and says, “The consequences for all of us are astronomical.” [Atlantic Monthly, 5/96]
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/essa ... aeedsheikh
9/11 Paymaster Saeed Sheikh
By Paul Thompson
June 1993-October 1994: Saeed Sheikh, a brilliant British student at the London School of Economics, drops out of school and moves to his homeland of Pakistan to become a terrorist. Two months later, he begins training in Afghanistan at camps run by al-Qaeda and the Pakistani army. By mid-1994, he has become a terrorist instructor. In June 1994, he begins kidnapping Western tourists in India. In October 1994, he is captured after kidnapping three Britons and an American, and is put in a maximum-security prison (see November 1994-December 1999). The ISI pays for a lawyer to defend him. [Los Angeles Times, 2/9/02, Daily Mail, 7/16/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] His supervisor for his terror work is an ISI officer named Ijaz Shah (see February 5, 2002). [Times of India, 3/12/02, Guardian, 7/16/02] Al-Qaeda and the ISI later rescue him from prison (see December 24-31, 1999) and he becomes a central figure in the financing of the 9/11 plot (see Early August 2001 (D)).
1999 (J): The London Times later claims that British intelligence secretly offers 9/11 paymaster Saeed Sheikh, imprisoned in India (see November 1994-December 1999) for kidnapping Britons and Americans (see June 1993-October 1994), an amnesty and the ability to "live in London a free man" if he will reveal his links to al-Qaeda. He apparently refuses. [Daily Mail, 7/16/02, London Times, 7/16/02] Yet after he is rescued in a hostage swap deal (see December 24-31, 1999), the press reports that he, in fact, is freely able to return to Britain. [Press Trust of India, 1/3/00] He visits his parents there in 2000 and again in early 2001. [Vanity Fair, 8/02, BBC, 7/16/02, Telegraph, 7/16/02] He is not charged with kidnapping until well after 9/11 (see November 2001-February 5, 2002). Those kidnapped by Saeed call the government's decision not to try him a "disgrace" and "scandalous." [Press Trust of India, 1/3/00] The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review later suggests that not only is Saeed closely tied to both the ISI and al-Qaeda, but may also have been working for the CIA: "There are many in Musharraf's government who believe that Saeed Sheikh's power comes not from the ISI, but from his connections with our own CIA. The theory is that ... Saeed Sheikh was bought and paid for." [Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] Did or does Saeed have some kind of deal with British or US intelligence?
Daniel Pearl.
January 6, 2002: The Boston Globe reports that shoe bomber Richard Reid (see December 22, 2001 (B)) may have had ties with an obscure Pakistani group called Al-Fuqra. Reid apparently visited the Lahore, Pakistan home of Ali Gilani, the leader of Al-Fuqra. [Boston Globe, 1/6/02] Reporter Daniel Pearl reads the article, and decides to investigate (see also December 24, 2001-January 23, 2002). [Vanity Fair, 8/02] Pearl believes he is on his way to interview Gilani when he is kidnapped (see January 23, 2002). [Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] A 1995 State Department report said Al-Fuqra's main goal is "purifying Islam through violence." [Vanity Fair, 8/02] Intelligence experts say it is a splinter group of Jaish-e-Mohammad, and has ties to al-Qaeda. [UPI, 1/29/02] Al-Fuqra claims close ties with the Muslims of the Americas, a US tax-exempt group claiming about 3,000 members living in rural compounds in 19 states, the Caribbean and Europe. Members of Al-Fuqra are suspected of at least 13 fire bombings and 17 murders, as well as theft and credit-card fraud. Gilani had links to people involved in the 1993 WTC bombing, and he fled the US after the bombing. Gilani admits he works with the ISI and lives freely in Pakistan. [Boston Globe, 1/6/02, The News, 2/15/02, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] Saeed Sheikh "has long had close contacts" with the group, and praises Gilani for his "unexplained services to Pakistan and Islam." [The News, 2/18/02, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] There has been surprisingly little media coverage of Al-Fuqra, given their US presence and al-Qaeda connection (see also [Knight Ridder, 12/25/01, New York Times, 1/3/02, New York Post, 2/10/02, Rocky Mountain News, 2/12/02]).
February 5, 2002: Pakistani police, with the help of the FBI, determine Saeed Sheikh is behind the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl (see January 23, 2002), but are unable to find him. They round up about ten of his relatives and threaten to harm them unless he turns himself in. Saeed Sheikh does turn himself in, but to Ijaz Shah, his former ISI boss (see June 1993-October 1994). [Boston Globe, 2/7/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] The ISI holds Saeed for a week, but fails to tell Pakistani police or anyone else that they have him (see February 12, 2002). This "missing week" is the cause of much speculation. The ISI never tells Pakistani police any details about this week. [Newsweek, 3/11/02] Saeed also later refuses to discuss the week or his connection to the ISI, only saying, "I will not discuss this subject. I do not want my family to be killed." He adds, "I know people in the government and they know me and my work." [Newsweek, 3/13/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] It is suggested Saeed is held for this week to make sure that Pearl was killed. Saeed later says that during this week he got a coded message from the kidnappers that Pearl had been murdered. Also, the time might have been spent working out a deal with the ISI over what Saeed would tell police and the public. [Newsweek, 3/11/02] Several others with both extensive ISI and al-Qaeda ties wanted for the kidnapping are arrested around this time. [Washington Post, 2/23/02, London Times, 2/25/02] One of these men, Khalid Khawaja, "has never hidden his links with Osama bin Laden. At one time he used to fly Osama's personal plane." [PakNews, 2/11/02]
April 5, 2002: Later in the month the London Times says that the real truth about Saeed won't come out in the trial because, "Sheikh is no ordinary terrorist but a man who has connections that reach high into Pakistan's military and intelligence elite and into the innermost circles of Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization." [London Times, 4/21/02]
insidejob